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Abstract: This article critically discusses how Turkish migrants as an established migrant group have interpreted 
and acted on the arrival of Syrian refugees in Berlin fr m 2015 nwards and whether their responses have resul-
ted in new spaces in which new contestations and/or solidarities emerge. To this end, it focuses on the processes 
and the ways in which established groups (re-)articulate their urban citizenship and belonging to a particular urban 
space in relation to newcomers. Building on the analytical framework of relational and agency-centered articulation 
of urban citizenship and drawing on research data collected in the Kreuzberg and Neukölln neighborhoods of Berlin, 
the analysis has two main findings. Firstly, Turkish igrants have been involved in solidarity activities and contribute 
to a more inclusive urban citizenship regarding Syrian refugees. At the same time, they perceive Syrian refugees 
as a threat to their standing in the city and the r right to the usage of urban space. This results in a more defensive 
urban citizenship against the r fugees. Secondly, the u equal po er relations and local, national and transitional 
dynamics act as intervening factors shaping Turkis  migrants’ responses to Syrian refugees and the process of 
urban citiz nsh p formatio . 
Keywords: Berlin, urban citizenship, Turkish migrants, Syrian refugees, spatial encounter
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel diskutiert kritisch, wie türkische Migranten als etablierte Gruppe ab 2015 die 
Ankunft syrischer Flüchtlinge in Berlin wahrgenommen und darauf reagiert haben und ob durch ihre Reaktionen 
neue Räume der Auseinandersetzung und/oder Solidaritäten entstanden sind. Zu diesem Zweck werden die Pro-
zesse und die Art und Weise untersucht, in der etablierte Gruppen ihre „urban citizenship“ und ihre Zugehörigkeit 
zu einem b stimmten urbanen Raum gegenüber Neuankömmlingen artikulieren. Aufbauend auf dem analytischen 
Konzept der relationalen und akteurzentrierten Artikulation von „urban citizenship“ und Forschungsdaten aus den 
Berliner Stadtteilen Kreuzberg nd Neukölln kommt die Studie zu zwei Hauptergebnissen. Erstens waren türkische 
Migrant  in Sol daritätsaktionen ei gebunden und haben zu einer integrativeren „urban citizenship“ in Bezug auf 
syrische Flüchtlinge beigetragen. Gleichzeitig haben sie syrische Flüchtlinge als Bedrohung für ihr Ansehen in der 
Stadt und ihr Recht auf Nutzung des städtischen Raums wahrgenommen. Dies führte zu einer defensiveren „urban 
„Urban Citizenship“ und räumliche 
Aushandlungsproze se zwischen türkischen 
Migranten und syrischen Flüchtlingen
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1  Introduction
Since the eruption of the Syrian war in 2011, over five 
million people have fled violence and sought asylum 
mainly in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Jordan 
and Lebanon. In the meantime, European countries 
have been widely criticized for not sharing responsibil-
ity. With its historic decision to open its borders to ref-
ugees stuck in Hungary in the summer of 2015, only 
Germany (and Sweden) have followed a relatively “open 
door” approach towards Syrian refugees. In particular, 
Germany suspended the Dublin Protocol for Syrian ref-
ugees “by declaring all Syrian asylum-seekers welcome 
to remain in Germany – no matter which EU country 
they had first entered” (Hall/Lichfield 2015). Since then, 
Germany has received the highest number of first-time 
asylum applications in Europe in absolute terms and has 
become the most preferred destination for many Syrian 
refugees (Katz/Noring/Garrelts 2016: 3).
Regarding resettlement, refugees have been distrib-
uted among the 16 federal states (Länder) of Germany 
through the so-called Königstein quota system. States 
are accordingly allocated new refugee residents based 
on their capacity to resettle them, their tax revenues 
and current population. The city-state of Berlin, which 
comprises 12 residential districts, has accepted the 
highest number of refugees per square kilometer of all 
the German states (see Katz/Noring/Garrelts 2016: 11 f.). 
One of the most multicultural cities in Europe and home 
to diverse groups of migrants, Berlin has witnessed 
various changes and challenges since the refugees 
arrived. As in other cities like Munich and Hamburg, the 
first arrivals were welcomed by a large proportion of the 
public and supported by grass-roots movements. The 
city witnessed several public campaigns of solidarity and 
a host of civil society initiatives to facilitate integration. 
Rising numbers of refugees, however, also created new 
spaces of contestation especially in areas related to the 
labor market, housing, education, and so on.
Against this backdrop, this article analyzes how 
the established Turkish migrant community has inter-
preted and responded to the arrival of Syrian refugees 
in Berlin and whether their responses have prompted 
new patterns and relations of contestation and/or soli-
darity.1 Building upon the theoretical and conceptual 
framework of relational and agency-centered articulation 
of urban citizenship, it critically examines how/whether 
established migrant groups (re-) articulate their urban 
citizenship and belonging to a particular space through 
their encounter with newcomers, and whether this (re-) 
articulation transforms and challenges existing inclusion/
exclusion dynamics in the urban space. While numerous 
works have examined the relationship between Turkish 
migrants and urban regeneration, especially in the 
German context, their perceptions about other migrant 
groups have yet to be analyzed. Moreover, the implica-
tions of encounters between these two different migrant 
groups for the construction and meaning of (urban) cit-
izenship have been mostly overlooked. Any attempt to 
close this gap requires making an “analytical distinc-
tion between Long-term residents and Newcomers [...] 
because the length of residence [...] represent[s...] a 
crucial factor” (Freiheit/Seidelsohn 2013: 13). As such, 
this article seeks to map out the complexities of migrant 
diversity and multiplicity of urban citizenships.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I outline the 
analytical framework, which is grounded in the relational 
and agency-based articulation of urban citizenship and 
combines elements from critical migration and urban 
studies. The next section is an outline of the methodol-
ogy and data collection process. The third section offers 
a brief account of Berlin as an urban space of migration, 
followed by an empirical analysis of Turkish migrants’ 
perceptions of and responses to Syrian refugees. The 
1  Here, an important clarification is necessary. The terms “Turkish 
migrants” and “Syrian refugees” are both problematic in the sense 
that these labels presuppose the idea that migrants are the effects 
(in both senses) of the nation-states from which they have come. 
However, many of those originating from Turkey and Syria do not 
identify as either “Turk” or “Syrian”, and are from a variety of ethnic 
and linguistic backgrounds. For example, many Turkey-origin 
migrants in Germany – whether guest workers or refugees – are 
in fact Kurdish speakers and identify as Kurdish. Similarly, many 
Syrian-origin refugees are Kurdish or identify as Arabic. With this 
discussion in mind, the article uses the terms critically in order to 
avoid the trap of “methodological nationalism”.
citizenship“ gegenüber den Flüchtlingen. Zweitens wirken die ungleichen Machtverhältnisse und die lokale, natio-
nale und transnationale Dynamik als intervenierende Faktoren, die die Reaktion türkischer Migranten auf syrische 
Flüchtlinge und den Prozess der Bildung von „urban citizenship“ beeinflussen.
Schlüsselwörter: Berlin, urban citizenship, türkische Migranten, syrische Flüchtlinge, räumliche Aushandlungspro-
zesse
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analysis elaborates further two different socio-spatial 
fields: spaces of solidarity and spaces of contestation. 
Two findings emerge as crucial. Firstly, the interplay 
between particular socio-economic, political, religious 
and ethnic characteristics of Turkish migrants shapes 
their social standing in urban space. Secondly, unequal 
power relations and local, national and transnational 
dynamics act as crucial intervening factors shaping 
urban-citizenship-making practices of Turkish migrants 
and their responses to Syrian refugees. 
2  A Relational and Agency-
centered Articulation of Urban 
Citizenship 
A burgeoning literature has emerged in the recent 
decades critiquing certain basic tenets of established 
migration research, such as “nation-states as a unit of 
analysis”, “liberal-democratic notion of citizenship” and 
“treating migrants as passive victims” (see, among 
others, Işın 2002; Castaneda 2012; Bork-Hüffer/Etzold/
Gransow et al. 2016). Asserting that such conceptualiza-
tions are the products of an unthinking “methodological 
nationalism” (Wimmer/Glick Schiller 2003) that reduces 
society to the nation-state as a unit of analysis, recent 
studies have sought to move beyond them. They do so 
by foregrounding the city as an important, if not primary, 
context in which institutional policies and migrant prac-
tices over space-making interact, producing diverse 
outcomes (Glick Schiller/Çağlar 2009; Kalandides/Vaiou 
2012).
This shift in focus to the city has also triggered crit-
icisms of the notion of national citizenship that limits 
migrant claim-making to legal rights and duties. Accord-
ing to critical migration and urban scholars, confining cit-
izenship to the national level risks painting migrants as 
passive “victims trapped between an economic demand 
for their cheap labor and a political system that denies 
their rights” (Castaneda 2012: 71). Such a liberal-demo-
cratic notion of citizenship strips away migrants’ agency 
to challenge or change political structures and policies 
(see Bork-Hüffer/Etzold/Gransow et al. 2016). Reflecting 
on the “gap between membership and substantive rights” 
and how discriminated groups mobilize for “recognition 
and equal rights” (Gebhardt 2016: 6), scholars explore 
practices “through which individuals and groups formu-
late and claim new rights or struggle to expand or main-
tain existing rights” (Işın/Wood 1999: 4). For example, in 
her study on guest worker mobilization in Europe, Soysal 
(1994: 164) highlights how guest workers without formal 
citizenship rights have developed new “patterns of incor-
poration” transcending the “logic of national citizenship.” 
Similarly, Castaneda (2012: 71 f.) shows that migrants 
may gain “de facto” citizenship status through their 
involvement in the labor market (formally or informally), 
by paying taxes, volunteering, working for governmental 
agencies or establishing organizations. This implies that 
citizenship practices include but are not limited to voting.
A rich literature has thus emerged probing into the 
connections between migration, urban citizenship and 
cities. This literature is based on an idea of citizenship 
as a social practice that enables migrants to act beyond 
the state through active local and transnational engage-
ment (see Benhabib 1999; Ehrkamp/Leitner 2003) and 
to contribute to the regeneration of cities (Hillmann 2011; 
Çağlar/Glick Schiller 2018). Without discounting the role 
of national citizenship and establishing simplistic binary 
oppositions between migrants and the “native” popula-
tion, a number of scholars adopt a relational and agen-
cy-centered approach to urban citizenship (see among 
others Ehrkamp/Leitner 2003; Varsanyi 2006; Cohen 
2015; Cohen/Margalit 2015). Taking urban citizenship as 
a “socio-spatial institution” and as a “process” through 
which migrants and residents re-articulate and contest 
its meanings and practices (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 668), 
this approach allows us to trace the role of agency and 
practices of migrants and residents regardless of their 
formal citizenship status, unequal power positions, and 
local, national and transnational dynamics, all of which 
are important intervening factors shaping the (re-) articu-
lation of urban citizenship relationally and hierarchically.
Inspired by Lefebvre’s concept of the “right to the 
city”, the agency-centered articulation of urban citizen-
ship frames citizenship as intrinsically linked to local pat-
terns of residence, belonging and community participa-
tion. As such, it grounds claim-making within and over 
a particular urban space (see Lefebvre 1996; Harvey 
2012; Purcell 2014). Whether or not they are national 
citizens, those who inhabit urban space are considered 
to justly claim the right to urban space. In this context, 
this approach promotes “new formations and normative 
definitions of belonging” in urban space (Fenster 2010: 
63). Urban citizenship as such refers to progressive and 
inclusionary acts striving to enhance residential rights for 
all inhabitants (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 667).
A group of scholars has taken these claims further, 
underlining the role of power positions and the heter-
ogeneity of diverse groups in urban citizenship and 
space-making. Taking encounters between established 
groups and newcomers seriously, they problematize 
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reductionist and taken-for-granted assumptions about 
international incoming groups as “homogenously poor, 
marginalized and powerless” (Smith/Guarnizo 2009: 
619) and established residents as “a cohesive group 
of metropolitan ‘haves’” (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 669). 
Instead, they tease out the contested nature of space- 
and claim-making by various actors, who are “differently 
situated both spatially and temporally” (Cohen/Margalit 
2015: 669; see also Ehrkamp/Leitner 2013). Such rela-
tional and agency-centered articulation of urban citi-
zenship sheds light on “the ways in which city residents 
articulate their identities relationally and hierarchically 
against new and old ‘others’” (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 666), 
given that urban space is political and formed by unequal 
power geometries (see Massey 2011). This throws into 
sharp relief questions of “who participates” and “power 
relations and power differentials that impact on the 
ability to participate in meaningful ways” in urban space 
(Kemp/Lebuhn/Rattner 2015: 707). As expressed further 
by Smith and Guarnizo (2009: 620 f.), “the question of 
‘inhabitance’ is often fought out along the lines of who 
has the power to decide who is an established resident, 
legitimate local actor, or who is acceptable as a new res-
ident and, thus, who has the right to local socio-political, 
cultural, and economic space and who does not.” The 
rest of this article demonstrates different migrant groups 
have access to varying degrees of socio-economic and 
political capital, which produces hierarchies among and 
within them. In other words, not every migrant or resident 
is equally positioned to make claims to the city. These 
asymmetrical power relations create “tensions” over 
urban citizenship (Smith/Guarnizo 2009: 620) and con-
testations between different groups struggling over the 
same urban space.
Cohen (2015: 162 f.) explains the emergence of these 
tensions and spaces of contestation between newcom-
ers and established residents within the so-called defen-
sive urban citizenship framework, “whereby groups mar-
ginalized by the prevailing urban economic and identity 
regimes attempt to fend off threats to their localities and 
resources.” In doing this, the established groups, who 
feel threatened both by structural factors and the prac-
tices of claim-making of newcomers, tend to develop a 
“reactive place-based identity” by raising urban bound-
aries and utilizing all the resources at their disposal, 
including “formal state and urban affiliations, ethno-ra-
cial and religious boundaries, as well as physical control 
over urban space” (Cohen 2015: 170 f.).
However, contestation may not be the only socio-spa-
tial framework portraying encounters of different groups 
and their perceptions vis-a-vis each other within a spe-
cific urban space. Taking urban citizenship as a process 
of “shifting alliances and antagonisms between group-
ings” (Painter 2005: 12), spaces of solidarities may also 
emerge between and within different groups of residents 
or migrants. In contrast to the defensive citizenship 
approach, newcomers may not be perceived as “con-
tenders for scarce urban socio-political and economic 
resources” (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 669). Rather, they are 
likely to be perceived as valid members of the city with a 
legitimate right to actively be involved in and claim urban 
space, as the right-to-the-city approach promotes. In this 
context, independent of their power position in the city 
and sense of marginalization in socio-economic, politi-
cal and cultural terms, a “left-wing” political orientation 
may feed into solidarities with “newcomers”, claiming 
the right to the city for all (Cohen/Margalit 2015: 669.). 
Apart from this idealistic and normative understanding 
of belonging, shared or similar experiences and griev-
ances can also lead to alliances and the mobilization of 
solidarities among diverse groups with different power 
positions in urban space (see Miller/Nicholls 2013). 
However, these kinds of individual or collective political 
identities may by themselves fall short of conveying an 
understanding of the processes at play shaping different 
forms of responses to the newcomers’ incorporation into 
the urban space.
This brings us to the role of “intricate local, national 
and transnational interconnections” that shape urban-cit-
izenship-making practices and negotiations between 
different groups of residents over residential claims 
(Ehrkamp/Leitner 2013: 129). Scholars with a rela-
tional and agency-centered perspective on citizenship 
draw attention to exclusionary/inclusionary dynamics 
imposed by local and national policies. In other words, 
states’ power to shape national citizenship models, inte-
gration policies and urban policies are all important as 
“socio-political and physical conditions of spaces [that] 
frame [migrants’] livelihoods, opportunities, and agency” 
(Bork-Hüffer/Etzold/Gransow et. al. 2016: 128). For 
example, national citizenship models and discourses not 
only condition migrants’ legal, social and political rights 
and opportunities, but also “the frameworks, key terms, 
metaphors, and language of immigration debates, and 
the representation of immigrants in the social imaginary” 
(Çağlar 2001: 602). Similarly, the political agency of any 
resident – whether a migrant or “native” – cannot be 
disconnected from the existing urban regime, its partici-
patory dynamics and instruments or its socio-economic, 
political and cultural fragmentations. To put it differently, 
migrants’ ability and their interaction with other groups 
and actors are conditioned by political opportunity 
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structures that greatly influence “migrant identities and 
their patterns of organization and political participation” 
(Koopmans 2004: 451 f.). Hence, any analysis exploring 
the role of migrants or residents in city making has to con-
sider the specific political structures and urban regimes 
in which they operate (see Kemp/Lebuhn/Rattner 2015).
Furthermore, migrants’ transnational ties and con-
nections to their “homelands”, which are sustained with 
the help of developments in transport and communication 
(Koopmans, 2004: 5) should also be taken into account 
in exploring the migrants’ urban citizenship claims and 
practices. As underlined by Glick Schiller and Meinhof 
(2011: 25), migrants’ practices are shaped by transna-
tional fields and “networks of networks, linking [them] to 
the institutional structures of more than one state.” This 
transnationality results in “multiple sources and dynam-
ics of migrant agencies, socialites and belongings” that 
are implicit in the migrants’ claim-making in urban space 
(Çağlar 2016: 953). 
3  Methodology 
In the initial phase of the research, I collected secondary 
sources through archival research, mainly written works, 
and information provided by governmental authorities 
and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), in order 
to build a contextual analysis. The second phase of the 
research involved fieldwork. Firstly, following the logic 
of non-participant observation, the data were gathered 
in the Berlin neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, 
which host a significant number of Turkish migrants 
and Syrian refugees. I also participated in the activities 
and meetings of Turkish migrants and their organiza-
tions. During these observations, informal discussion 
with migrants contributed greatly to data collection and 
provided me with valuable, first-hand information on 
migrants’ experiences and perceptions and the impacts 
of institutional policies on their lives in urban space.
Secondly, focus groups and semi-structured inter-
views were conducted with Turkish migrants, represent-
atives/members of their organizations and politicians 
of Turkish and Kurdish background to understand how 
they have interpreted and acted on the arrival of Syrian 
refugees. More precisely, 40 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted in Neukölln and Kreuzberg between 
March 2017 and February 2018. Interviewees included 
all four generations of migrants, including former guest 
workers, their children and grandchildren, refugees, and 
those who came as students and later settled in Berlin. 
It should be noted that the interviewees were chosen 
both purposefully and via the snowball method, taking 
the fact that migrants are differentially positioned in the 
social, cultural and political life of the city according to 
their gender, class, legal and ethnic/religious affiliation. 
Furthermore, interviewees came from different occupa-
tions with different levels of educational attainment and 
socio-economic capital, such as politicians, dönerci, a 
lawyer, a journalist, factory workers, business people 
and retired migrants.
Interviews were also conducted with migrant organ-
izations for two reasons. First, they provided useful 
information to understand the general framework about 
how migrants view their participation in the city and 
what kind of responses they develop towards other 
groups. Second, “associations can be crucial in chan-
neling immigrant discontent by voicing immigrant needs, 
making collective political claims, combining efforts, and 
dissipating discontent and alienation – even when they 
fail to obtain all of their explicit demands” (Castaneda 
2012: 57). Organizations interviewed included religious 
associations (such as Sunni and Alevi groups), political 
parties from across the spectrum, including the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, the Left and the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU), economic and social 
organizations, and organizations promoting the rights of 
certain disadvantaged groups, such as migrant women 
and refugees. The two focus group interviews were con-
ducted with male and female migrants from Turkey. They 
were recruited through Kreuzberg and Neukölln-based 
Turkish NGOs that provide services to Turkish migrants. 
Both in the semi-structured interviews and focus groups, 
confidentiality and anonymity were underlined. Consist-
ent with the standard techniques of analyzing interview 
data, common themes and patterns were identified and 
interpreted in accordance with the analytical framework. 
During the interviews, every effort was made to avoid 
suggesting or presuming any particular views, allowing 
migrants maximum space to voice their own experiences 
and concerns as they interpret them. 
4  Berlin, Migrants and Urban 
Regeneration
4.1  Turkish Migrants and Changing 
Neighborhoods
Since the signing of a labor recruitment agreement 
between (West) Germany and Turkey under the “guest 
worker” system, Turkish migrants have contributed to 
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the regeneration of Berlin, where they form the largest 
migrant group and the largest Turkish community 
outside Turkey. In particular, they have led to the emer-
gence of new political, economic and social spaces by 
their socio-economic, cultural and political practices. 
These spaces were first experienced in Kreuzberg and 
Neukölln, former West Berlin neighborhoods, as many 
first-generation migrants from Turkey settled there from 
the beginning. This was mainly because in these neigh-
borhoods, “much of the housing was dilapidated and 
lacked modern conveniences, rent was cheap. There 
was less competition from Germans and less discrimina-
tion by landlords” (Kil/Silver 2006: 97; see also Huning/
Schuster 2015). Since then these two neighborhoods 
have become a new “home” for Turkish migrants. As they 
settled in and established businesses including cafés 
and restaurants, they started to transform the urban 
space. They formed their own political, social and eco-
nomic organizations as well as places of worship. Edu-
cational attainment has also gradually improved, with the 
share of migrants working in professions growing and 
a considerable urban business elite emerging (see Kil/
Silver 2006).
This process reached a certain critical mass of vis-
ibility once Turkish migrants decided that they were no 
longer “guests”, but rather permanent residents. Various 
interviewees noted that at first migrants and their organ-
izations oriented their activities towards Turkey. But after 
it became apparent that most of them would never per-
manently return to Turkey, some organizations re-ori-
ented their focus almost entirely to local questions of 
justice, working for a range of marginalized and discrim-
inated groups, including other immigrants and refugees, 
women, Jewish people, the unemployed and the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender community. These organ-
izations partake in politics and the social life of the city. 
They contest discrimination and exclusion because they 
acknowledge they have the political power (read: political 
agency) to affect real change. This suggests that Turkish 
migrants have “improved” their power position in the city, 
and engage in claim- and space-making through their 
practices and beyond their formal citizenship status.
Despite these achievements, all interviewees pointed 
to ongoing obstacles to participation and claim-making. 
The most important factor mentioned was the failure of 
national migration policy to incorporate Turkish migrants 
into German society. Germany’s belated acceptance of 
being an immigration country and the resulting indiffer-
ence to the problems and situation of migrants were the 
most frequently cited issues. The enduring impact of 
the “guest” discourse, on both sides, has been a driving 
element in this context, according to the interviewees. 
They also emphasized that a lack of dual citizenship 
rights has prevented them from fully engaging in polit-
ical life and from developing a feeling of belonging in 
Germany, despite their formal and informal practices. 
These accounts show the role of national citizenship 
status and policies over their claim-making. It is the 
everydayness of exclusion that is mainly underlined by 
interviewees. Ongoing discrimination and racism experi-
enced in every sphere of life – ranging from employment 
to education to housing – were defined as the impor-
tant reasons that have hampered their inclusion in the 
urban fabric. The words of the interviewee from the Left 
Party summarizes all these problems as follows: “we, as 
Turks or Kurds, have had to struggle with discrimination 
not only by law but in social life: in cafés, bars, schools, 
while looking for an apartment, in the workplace, in par-
liament, with police. Despite having citizenship rights, 
you have the feeling that you are not equal to Germans.” 
Furthermore, the transnational dynamics and identities 
of Turkish migrants challenge their ability to contribute 
to urban space-making. All interviews referred to the reli-
gious, ethnic and political divide as a crucial factor pre-
venting them from forming a collective force to defend 
their rights in the city.
Last but not least, interviewees noted that the neo-
liberal transformation of urban space in Berlin has also 
limited the extent to which they practice their right to 
urban space and advance claims accordingly, leading 
to socio-spatial marginalization. Gentrification in Kreuz-
berg and Neukölln, with the rise in rents that inevitably 
follows, is a central element here. Previously condemned 
as “slums” and “criminal hotspots”, now both neighbor-
hoods are highly popular with “new Berliners”, including 
young professionals, middle-class families, artists and 
investors (Lebuhn 2015: 106). This is especially true 
for Neukölln, which for a long-time was home to a high 
percentage of migrants of Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic 
origin, and was characterized by “social marginality and 
spatial disadvantages [...] and a negative image in the 
eyes of both residents and outsiders” (Freiheit/Seidel-
sohn 2016: 80). As expressed by all interviewees, gen-
trification and the ensuing gap that has arisen between 
long-term rental agreements and new contracts, have 
led some to move elsewhere where rents are more 
affordable. The privatization of public housing units, 
together with the rising number of households, has exac-
erbated this and has seen rents rise in Berlin more than 
in almost any other German city (Holm 2013: 174). One 
interviewee who has been active in local institutions and 
in the housing sector noted: “The ongoing gentrification 
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process reflects the demands of the market. This has 
not been a conscious move aimed at expelling Turkish 
migrants from Kreuzberg and Neukölln. At the beginning, 
for example, Kreuzberg was a place near to the Wall, 
full of the ugliest houses where nobody wanted to live. 
However, later, the neighborhood was modernized and 
became a central and popular district.” 
This transformation reflects how urban citizenship 
is played out relationally and hierarchically. Through the 
practices of urban citizenship, Turkish migrants have 
made these neighborhoods attractive places. While at 
the same time, as Castaneda (2012: 72) argues, “the 
ultimate benefits are often enjoyed by others who have 
a legal right to the city, access to highly paid jobs, and 
some leisure time to consume the new and increasingly 
expensive and exclusive services.”
Berlin has introduced policy mechanisms to tackle 
these issues. From the beginning of the 1990s, certain 
programs were introduced to fight social and economic 
marginalization. The most important was the Social City 
Program agreed in 1999 between the federal govern-
ment and the states, targeting so-called disadvantaged 
districts, like Kreuzberg and Neukölln. Focusing on 
developing solutions to unemployment, limited access 
to education, social exclusion and marginalization, the 
program established neighborhood management offices 
– the so-called “quartier managers” (QM) – to coordinate 
the activities of the local municipal actors and stake-
holders. These offices aim to support civic participation 
in decision making through a neighborhood council, an 
elected body of local representatives consisting of resi-
dents (rather than citizens), businesses and institutions 
(schools, associations, cultural centers, sometimes 
police), that takes decisions about how to use the neigh-
borhood fund (Kalandides/Vaiou 2012: 257). In addi-
tion, Berlin’s official Handbook of Participation details 
the instruments and policies of encouraging local resi-
dents’ and actors’ involvement in urban space-making 
and “democratization of city making” through bottom-up 
participation of residents and neighborhood groups 
(Kemp/Lebuhn/Rattner 2015: 710). These instruments 
are believed to provide migrants with an opportunity 
to participate in public decisions that affect their lives 
(Kalandides/Vaiou 2012: 257). One of the interviewees 
from a Neukölln-based Alevi organization stated: “We 
would like to raise our voices here. That is why we have 
become involved in the projects of the QM to introduce 
ourselves and our neighborhoods. We aim at integrating 
here both socially and culturally. We live here and we 
have to integrate here. However, for us, integration does 
not refer to assimilation; it means participation.”
However, for others, success has remained limited. 
As underlined by Freiheit and Seidelsohn (2016: 78), 
these initiatives do not respond to the structural sources 
of social inequality but provide only a means to deal with 
the symptoms that arise therein. This point was also 
expressed by a long-term employee of a quartier man-
agement, who I interviewed: “Theoretically, it is a social 
democratic idea. But when it comes to the implementa-
tion and outcome of this program, I can say that it does 
not touch upon real structural problems. Why are there 
so many poor people living in this area, why do chil-
dren in these neighborhoods remain in poor conditions 
or uneducated? How can this poverty be reduced? But 
without this program, what would happen? This is my 
justification. For ten years, I have been working here and 
I have been trying to justify my position arguing that at 
least there is such a program; otherwise nobody would 
care about these neighborhoods.”
4.2  Refugees Welcome?
As mentioned, Germany in general and Berlin in par-
ticular witnessed unexpected levels of arrivals in the 
summer of 2015 and became the scene of mass solidar-
ity campaigns and initiatives. But at the same time, the 
arrivals created various problems about the registration, 
accommodation and education of refugees. Grassroots 
refugee rights movements or the so-called welcoming 
initiatives arguably filled the gap between the ability 
and resources of state agencies and the scale of the 
problems (see Katz/Noring/Garrelts 2016; Mayer 2018). 
These initiatives organized various solidarity campaigns, 
sought donations, and provided refugees with food, 
clothes, legal counsel, and German classes. Hundreds 
of volunteers from different backgrounds with diffuse 
social status relating to age, gender, class, religion, eth-
nicity and educational level engaged in these solidarity 
endeavors. Turkish migrants and their organizations also 
engaged in support of the refugees. However, this initial 
welcoming culture seems to have reached its limit. The 
interviewees highlighted two events in 2016 – the alleged 
involvement of Syrians in sexual assaults at New Year 
celebrations in Cologne and the terrorist attack at Ber-
lin’s Christmas market conducted by a Tunisian national 
whose application for asylum had been rejected – as sig-
nificantly weakening this “welcoming culture.” An inter-
viewee stated: “People have come to think that these ref-
ugees are coming here and killing us; then the question 
becomes, ‘Why should I help them’?”
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At the same time, national and local refugee policies 
have been revised in response to these mass arrivals. 
Germany is a federal state and within this system Berlin 
has a distinct status (alongside Hamburg and Bremen) 
as a Stadtstaat (city-state). For this reason, Berlin’s 
mayor doubles as the Ministerpräsident (minister-pres-
ident) of the state. Each state has its own budget and 
autonomy in key policy areas. Regarding migration, and 
especially the accommodation of refugees, the states 
formulate and implement their own housing, health, edu-
cation, language, vocational training and labor market 
integration policies. They define the terms for access 
to social services. Berlin, for example, has emphasized 
integration programs, including language and orientation 
courses, and vocational training since the Syrian refu-
gees arrived. Currently, attendance at these courses 
for Syrian refugees is compulsory at the federal level 
as well. Additionally, since the 2016 amendments to the 
federal refugee law, refugees have been able to access 
work rights sooner, now three months after their reg-
istration. These changes are well explained by one of 
the representatives of the biggest Turkish NGO: “The 
central problem has been Germany’s delayed accept-
ance that it has become an immigration country. This has 
been reflected in integration policies. However, recently 
there have been improvements in this field. Now, for 
example, the state provides language and job training 
courses and more employment opportunities. These are 
still not enough. These opportunities were not offered to 
first-generation Turks but were developed specifically 
for Syrians. For example, when Turkish migrants first 
arrived, there were no language courses. Currently, lan-
guage courses are compulsory for Syrian refugees. In 
this sense, the German state has learned the lessons 
from the past failures of integration.” 
Yet, certain restrictions have also been put in place 
in the face of increasing arrivals of Syrian refugees. 
Among many obstacles that have prevented the Syrians 
from receiving asylum in Germany are the reintroduc-
tion of the Dublin System2, the temporary border con-
trols with Austria and restrictions on family reunification. 
Interviewees also noted that they were left to cope with a 
lot of problems alone, including employment and accom-
modation. They have had to live in camps or sport halls 
for extended periods. Language problems and limited 
access to education prevented many from finding a job. 
2  The Dublin System determines the member state responsible for 
examining asylum claims. Here, the responsible state is usually the 
first entry point or the so-called first country of asylum.
4.3  Spaces of Solidarity 
Turkish migrants, individually or through their organiza-
tions and other grass-roots initiatives, engaged in sol-
idarity work with Syrian refugees. In this respect, they 
promoted a more inclusive urban citizenship, calling 
for and defending the incorporation of refugees into 
the urban fabric as valid members. They developed 
“empathy with their concerns, struggles and sufferings” 
thereby building coalition with other civil society organ-
izations and governmental authorities as well (Miller/
Nicholls 2013: 460). One organization member noted that 
the organization tries “to explain to Turkish migrants that 
we have had similar problems so we have the responsi-
bility to help them and share our experiences with them.” 
The supporters of the refugees belong to different age, 
income, occupation, education and gender groups, but 
among them left-wing groups and religious groups (both 
Alevi and Muslim) are more visible. Those with a refugee 
history were especially active in solidarity campaigns, 
drawing on their own experiences of forced migration to 
bond with newcomers.
In particular, their experiences with racism, margin-
alization and the failure of local and national integration 
policies appeared as underlying factors motivating their 
solidarity endeavors. As mentioned before, all interview-
ees stated that they had suffered discrimination and a 
lack of socio-economic and political rights in Germany. In 
this context, both migrants and the organizations (espe-
cially those with a leftist political orientation) expressed 
that they were in favor of a liberal refugee policy and 
long-term integration measures for Syrians. They also 
welcomed Merkel’s “open door” approach. At the same, 
they were critical of Germany’s restrictive migration pol-
icies and argued that the past failures which had pre-
vented their incorporation should not be replicated in the 
case of the Syrian refugees. This is very well reflected in 
the words of one of the interviewees from a Turkish busi-
ness association, who underlines his advocacy for social 
democracy: “Turkish organizations have backed Syrian 
refugees since they first arrived. We urged the authorities 
to protect their rights and demanded that new schools 
and language courses be opened. In other words, old 
failures should not be replicated. Now, Germans have 
tended to see them as temporary; however, we see them 
as permanent residents, not as guests. Maybe some of 
them will return, but I guess most of them will stay here. 
We think that they should not be deported; on the con-
trary, we have supported their integration here.”
Turkish migrants’ involvement was also seen as 
an important sign of their capacity to re-articulate their 
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urban citizenship through their dealings with the issues 
impacting their lives in urban space. This can also be the 
expression of a sense of belonging to this very urban 
space. It further reflects how their power position in the 
urban space has transformed over time, implying that 
they became capable of voicing claims over who partic-
ipates in the urban space as valid members. One of the 
interviewees who has worked at Turkish organizations for 
a long time noted: “This refugee incident has contributed 
to the involvement of the Turkish community in German 
politics. This is a historical turning point for the commu-
nity here. For the first time, we have been assigned a 
duty. This actually shows that Turkish migrants are seen 
as part of this society. Now they are not only dealing with 
their own problems in Germany or Turkish politics, but 
they have become concerned about the problems of this 
society. Like German people, they have also been vol-
unteering for refugees. It is also important in terms of 
the recognition of the Turkish community as an active 
political agent. The image of the Turkish community has 
improved not only in cultural terms but also in the func-
tional context.”
Some of these initiatives were short-lived, having 
offered only first-aid to the first arrivals in 2015. For 
example, a group of Turkish women from one of the 
mosques organized daily visits to the refugees staying in 
hangars and provided them with food and other required 
items. Other religious and non-religious organizations as 
well as volunteer groups collected donations and distrib-
uted foodstuffs, clothes and similar necessities. 
There were also established and ongoing solidarity 
initiatives promoting long-term solutions with the aim of 
incorporating the refugees into the social fabric of the 
city. For example, they provided migrants with legal con-
sultation, language courses and guidance for finding 
accommodation. They also conducted solidarity pro-
jects in cooperation with local and national authorities. 
For instance, one of the biggest Turkish organizations, 
TBB – Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, 
which acts as an umbrella organization for almost 36 
other Turkish organizations and defines its goal as sup-
porting all Turkish migrants as well as other marginalized 
groups – conducted various projects and built solidarity 
networks. In cooperation with the Berlin Employment 
Agency, they organized an exhibition for vocational train-
ing in which various firms participated and offered young 
Syrian refugees with sufficient knowledge of German 
on-the-job training. More than 1,700 refugees attended 
this fair and around 200 refugees were placed in these 
firms.
Turkish migrants contributed to the incorporation 
of Syrians in the socio-cultural fabric of the city through 
social events and dinners. One of the interviewees 
working at a quartier management stated that: “Our pro-
jects have become successful in improving the neigh-
borhood relationships among Turkish and Syrian people. 
They came together during certain social events such 
as dinners and sport organizations.” Religious organiza-
tions, both Sunni and Alevi, organized regular meetings 
and dinners through which both groups have been able 
to get to know each other. However, their focus differs. 
Alevi organizations stated that they supported all refu-
gees regardless of their religious and other ethno-na-
tional identities, arguing that their notion of democracy 
was based on universal justice, equality, and solidarity. 
Sunni organizations, however, mainly targeted Sunni 
Syrians on the basis of religious fraternity and ethnic-kin-
ship.
Kurdish and Turkish politicians, especially from the 
Greens and the Left Party, have fought for the rights of 
refugees and raised their concerns in parliament. They 
were critical of the current policies. For example, the 
interviewee from the Left Party argued: “There is not a 
‘real’ or sincere welcoming culture; rather there is the 
question of when they are going back to their homes. 
The idea is that they are guests and temporary here and 
following the end of the war, they have to go back to 
Syria. Three thousand refugees out of around one million 
already returned to Syria, either because they were not 
recognized as refugees and therefore sent back or the 
living conditions did not satisfy them or meet their expec-
tations. On the one hand, Germany is trying to send 
these refugees back; on the other hand, it is trying to use 
them to fill labor shortages in certain sectors, such as 
health. So, there is no improvement in Germany’s migra-
tion policy. The long-lasting failures and failed policies 
of integration have fed into the rise of anti-migrant senti-
ments and right-wing and populist parties.”
Some of the interviewees also pointed out the insti-
tutional and bureaucratic problems impeding their soli-
darity efforts. For example, certain business organiza-
tions called on their members to hire the Syrian refugees 
in their respective sectors. One of them would like to 
engage in cooperation with the Federal Employment 
Agency to provide refugees with vocational training and 
employment opportunities. However, the interviewee 
from the Greens, who tried to establish such coopera-
tion stated that their calls had not yet received an ade-
quate response. Similarly, another interviewee from 
another business organization who was politically active 
for the rights of Turkish migrants said: “Our members 
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mostly complain about bureaucratic hurdles in terms of 
employing foreigners. We called on the state authorities 
to simplify these bureaucratic procedures. For example, 
we have been asked to employ Syrian refugees. Even 
though we have members, especially in the furniture 
sector, employing refugees, this is not at a satisfactory 
level because of the bureaucratic challenges discourag-
ing our members from doing so.”
Another major challenge underlined by the inter-
viewees is the current neo-liberal transformation and 
weakening of the welfare state. As mentioned above, the 
gentrification process and privatization of social housing 
were defined as crucial factors which have furthered 
the housing problem for all residents in Berlin. But, as 
the interviewee from the Greens noted, increasing rents 
together with a decreasing number of state-owned 
housing companies has hit the marginalized groups 
the hardest. Among migrants, refugees have been the 
worst affected due to their precarious economic and 
legal status which puts them in a disadvantaged position 
in the housing market. One of the interviewees stated 
that even though they have been helping the refugees 
to find accommodation, this was not an easy task. She 
further said that many non-camp refugees had to live 
in overcrowded flats to cover the rent. As newcomers, 
their insufficient networks limit their chances of finding 
accommodation as well. For example, during an informal 
talk with a Syrian refugee, he stated, “You, as a Turkish 
person, are in a more advantageous position in finding a 
flat because of the established networks among Turkish 
migrants.” This illustrates the importance of existing 
social ties and being part of an established community 
for life chances and involvement in urban space, on the 
one hand, and the unequal and hierarchical access to 
residential rights, on the other hand.
Furthermore, the limited participatory channels and 
long-lasting discrimination Turkish migrants have faced 
were another factor impeding their involvement in the 
refugee issue in particular and in political life in general. 
They referred to the importance of formal citizenship 
rights in their participatory dynamics. The organizations 
also complain about the state’s discriminatory attitude 
about funding. They argue that the German NGO pro-
jects are prioritized.
Another common theme, as underlined already and 
expressed by interviewees, is that Turkish migrants in 
Germany do not represent a homogenous group; rather, 
they diverge along various characteristics ranging from 
class to national, ethnic or religious origin. As some inter-
views illustrate, this heterogeneity has impeded common 
action in some areas, primarily concerning Syrian refu-
gees. They complained that even when they wanted to 
organize solidarity actions in support of refugees, they 
could not come together due to ideological, ethnic and 
religious differences. They further emphasized the recent 
developments in Turkey and President Erdogan’s poli-
cies towards the Turkish community here. They argue 
that as a result the community has become more polar-
ized. This transnational factor impacts on their ability 
to be a collective political force in urban space and to 
promote a more inclusive urban citizenship. 
4.4  Spaces of Contestation
The interviews also demonstrate widespread contes-
tation and discontent among Turkish migrants about 
Syrian refugees. The main source of contestation was 
fears about loss of their socio-economic status. Viewed 
from the perspective of a defensive citizenship frame-
work, Turkish migrants saw the refugees as a burden, 
rival or threat in the labor market, housing market and in 
education, or as “illegitimate” recipients of state benefits. 
The emergence of “‘hierarchy-conflicts’ about social posi-
tions, ‘distribution-conflicts’ about rare goods, employ-
ment, apartments, taxes etc., as well as ‘rule-conflicts’ 
about norms and values” (Freiheit/Seidelsohn 2013: 9) 
could be discerned. According to Huysmans, this also 
describes the securitization of certain groups that are 
considered a threat to security, the welfare state and the 
cultural identity of the “host” society (Huysmans 2006). 
This securitization process towards certain groups 
defined as risky “others” has become prominent follow-
ing the rise of neo-liberalism from the 1980s onwards. 
These “others” have increasingly become the scape-
goats for socio-economic problems, especially with a 
specific focus on the “threat” arising from “insurmounta-
ble” cultural differences (Balibar 1991).
Even though this securitization process depicts 
the representation of poor and Muslim migrants in the 
global North, the same hierarchical discourse is found 
among Turkish migrants in their dealings with Syrian 
refugees. As described by the interviewees, similar 
prejudices of Germans about Turkish migrants, now 
capture the latter’s perceptions about Syrian refugees. 
As Cohen (2015: 170) eloquently argues, this is closely 
related to the long-lasting marginalization of (certain) 
Turkish migrants. For example, especially those working 
in unqualified jobs argued that the arrival of refugees 
might lead to an increase in already high unemployment 
rates among Turkish migrants. Also, they think that the 
state may limit the welfare benefits granted to them and 
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instead allocate them to the refugees. Another underly-
ing theme was the perception that Syrian refugees would 
abuse the welfare state. One interviewee, having come 
to Germany as a guest worker, commented: “Why did 
they come here? They should have stayed in Syria to 
fight for their homeland. They just seek to abuse the 
welfare state in Germany. I have seen many young 
Syrian refugees; they have money, they have iPhones 
that I do not have. They are living in luxury here.” 
A similar account was put forward by another retired 
guest worker: “What I have observed here is that those 
who are well-educated and in good economic situations 
have been able to come here. For example, I participated 
in solidarity campaigns of a Turkish organization and 
saw that they [the refugees] had worn luxury shoes and 
clothes in Syria; they did not like the shoes that we gave 
them. In my imagination, a person who flees war does 
not have any clothes, food or bread. [But this group] use 
iPhones. I think they abused the German state’s aid.”
In line with these perceptions, another point that was 
underlined by many interviewees is that Turkish migrants 
were “jealous” of Syrian refugees, as the latter were seen 
as more educated and qualified. One of the interviewees 
working on an integration course commented, “Many of 
them are engineers, nurses and doctors. And they have 
an incredible motivation to learn the language and they 
can learn so fast.” In this context, they are seen as rivals 
and a threat to the power position of the Turkish migrants 
in the labor market.
However, despite these fears in the economic realm, 
especially in döner restaurants and construction sectors, 
a significant number of Syrian refugees have had to work 
informally under precarious conditions. One of the politi-
cians stated, “I first heard this news in 2015, first I could 
not believe it, but it was true that Syrians have worked just 
for two Euros per hour at Turkish migrants’ workplaces in 
Neukölln.” Another interviewee stated, “I have an uncle 
who owns a kebab shop, and is informally employing two 
Syrian children.” He further described this situation as a 
“master-slave” relationship. A second-generation retired 
Turkish immigrant noted similarly, “As I experienced 
personally, some Syrian refugees have been informally 
employed in the Turkish-run construction sector. They 
are provided only with meals and accommodation. They 
represent a flexible and cheap labor force. Last time, I 
met a Syrian electronic engineer who was previously a 
manager of a company but had to leave his wife and 
children in Syria. He is now working as a simple worker 
at a Turkish firm. I felt the pain in his eyes.” 
It was also alleged that Turkish organizations had 
taken economic advantage of Syrian refugees. It was 
underlined that some of the Turkish NGOs offered lan-
guage courses, but they drew on funding from the state 
to do that. So, nothing has much changed for them. 
Indeed, they took advantage of this situation by receiving 
extra money from the state and supported their existing 
projects.
The increasing presence of Syrian refugees in Kreuz-
berg and Neukölln also furthered discontent among Turkish 
migrants. Indeed, the tension between Turkish migrants 
and the “native population” in these neighborhoods, which 
is closely linked to the neo-liberal transformation of urban 
space, has been complicated by the incorporation of a 
third group, Syrian refugees. As underlined by one inter-
viewee, “due to the gentrification process especially fol-
lowing the fall of the Berlin Wall which made Kreuzberg 
and Neukölln attractive districts, German people did not 
want ‘black heads’ [Turkish migrants] residing in these 
places. There emerged a contestation and competition in 
housing markets in these districts. Now, Turkish migrants 
do not want Syrians to live in these neighborhoods, which 
are seen as belonging to them.”
Similar accounts were put forward by a represent-
ative of a Neukölln-based NGO, who commented, “first 
Lebanese and now the Syrian refugees have been 
invading ‘our’ neighborhood and even pushing us out 
of our neighborhood through renting and buying apart-
ments and opening up shops and restaurants.” Another 
interviewee working in the housing sector commented 
that the privatization of state-owned companies has 
worsened the situation in the sector. He said, “With the 
arrival of the Syrian refugees, this problem has become 
more complicated. More social housing is needed. 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants have already experienced 
discrimination-related problems in the housing market. 
They think that their chances of finding accommodation 
would diminish with the arrival of Syrian refugees.”
Regarding the education field, an interviewee con-
tended that contestation better represents the situation. 
This interviewee has a consultation firm focusing on inte-
gration issues, and he stated that Turkish migrants were 
worried about overcrowded classes and the decreas-
ing quality of education resulting from the presence of 
refugee children without any knowledge of German. This 
has also led to spatial differentiation between the two 
groups. As underlined by various interviews, educated 
Turkish migrants have already started leaving Neukölln 
and Kreuzberg in order to provide their children with 
better education opportunities. According to them, the 
arrival of Syrian refugees has intensified this process.
Another common tendency is the securitization and 
criminalization of Syrian refugees by linking them to ter-
578   Burcu Togral Koca 
rorism, drug trafficking and violence. Especially for the 
secular section of Turkish migrants, Syrian refugees 
are conservative people who follow a radical interpre-
tation of Islam. They even urge their children to avoid 
certain parts of Neukölln due to this so-called radicali-
zation, which is perceived to be prompted by the arrival 
of the Syrian refugees. Similarly, there is a belief that 
the arrival of Syrian refugees increased crime rates. For 
Turkish migrants, Syrian refugees, who are mostly young 
and male, are involved in drug dealing and other petty 
crimes. The female interviewees also argued that the 
streets have become more dangerous for them (espe-
cially at night) because of Syrian men. During the focus 
group interviews with women, it was mentioned that 
Syrian men allegedly abused women and even physi-
cally attacked them on the streets. Even if the women 
had not themselves experienced such an incident, they 
believed that this could happen given the media reports 
of the so-called sexual harassment of women by Syrians 
in Cologne. Male interviewees also had similar accounts 
that many Syrian refugees were young and sexually 
inexperienced males, more prone to abuse women 
because of the liberal character of intersexual relation-
ships in Germany.
Their transnational ties also play an important role 
in these perceptions. Rising anti-Syrian racism and 
hate speech have become salient in parallel with the 
numerous demonstrations and attacks against Syrian 
refugees that have occurred in Turkey. This anti-Syr-
ian stance and the long-lasting anti-Arab sentiments in 
Turkey have influenced Turkish migrants’ views regard-
less of their political orientation. Both leftists and nation-
alists referred to the so-called cultural incompatibility of 
Syrian refugees with the “German” and “Turkish” way of 
life. This culturalism based on the fabrication of cultural 
differences into a threat has taken much of its power 
from the homogenization and essentialization of culture 
and identity. In particular, according to one interviewee 
working with a number of NGOs, while most Turkish 
migrants have successfully integrated into German 
society,  this would not be the case for Syrian refugees 
because of their cultural differences. He further argued 
that the German state would come to appreciate Turkish 
migrants in comparison, having seen how difficult it was 
for Arabs to integrate. Furthermore, Syrian refugees 
were seen as uncivilized, feudal, dirty, noisy and more 
prone to telling lies. One of the interviewees stated, “Ok, 
they have been fleeing the war, but Arabs in general and 
Syrian refugees in particular, are culturally so different 
from us. For example, eating food with one’s hands is 
not compatible with my culture. Or they speak so loudly 
that it disturbs those in the vicinity. Syrian women wear 
burqas and refrain from contacting other men. This cul-
tural difference bothers me a lot.”
As part of these dynamics of contestation, there is 
also a degree of indifference implying an insufficient 
level of contact between the two groups. Indeed, some of 
the interviewees showed no interest in Syrian refugees 
at all. During the interviews, this was represented as a 
conscious attitude. One of the interviewees stated that 
he gave up going to a café where he had been a daily 
visitor for the past ten years. He said that “now Syrians 
have invaded this place.” Also, the idea is that “we have 
to first deal with ‘our’ people and Syrian refugees are 
the responsibility of the German state” is another argu-
ment put forward by several interviewees. Similarly, this 
indifference was explained with a reference to a lack of 
infrastructure, including expertise, human resources and 
financial capacity. In their view, existing resources have 
to be used to incorporate “our” (i.e. Turkish) people.
Indeed, according to interviews, all these socio-eco-
nomic and cultural problems are related to the German 
refugee policy, which they view as “too” liberal. Many of 
them blamed Angela Merkel for acting impetuously in 
this “refugee crisis”, because, for them, these problems 
have intensified following the arrival of Syrian refugees. 
In line with this, another common theme that emerged in 
the interviews is that they had to struggle for a long time 
to achieve rights and the German state did not do any-
thing for them. But now, according to them, Syrians have 
gained various rights without doing anything or contribut-
ing to society. Among these, language courses, employ-
ment rights and state benefits are the most noted. 
5  Conclusion
Using a relational and agency-centered approach 
to urban citizenship, this article shows that Turkish 
migrants, as an established group, rearticulated and 
contested their urban citizenship and claim-making prac-
tices relationally and hierarchically vis-à-vis newcomers, 
namely, Syrian refugees. In this remaking of urban citi-
zenship, Turkish migrants’ spatial encounter with Syrian 
refugees and the ways in which the former responded 
to and acted on the arrival of the latter reveals the “mul-
tiplicity of urban citizenship(s), their variegated enti-
tlements and the political process through which they 
are claimed, (re)-distributed, negotiated and secured” 
(Cohen/Margalit 2015: 670). Turkish migrants devel-
oped both inclusive and defensive urban citizenship dis-
courses and practices against Syrian refugees, thereby 
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showing the contested nature of urban citizenship-mak-
ing constructed through a process of “shifting alliances 
and antagonisms between groupings” (Painter 2005: 
12). As this research further demonstrates, this process 
is shaped by the interplay between the practices/agency 
of residents/migrants, their power positions and local, 
national and transnational dynamics, and gives rise to 
new spaces of solidarities and contestations.
First, regardless of their occupation, age, gender 
and education level, leftist leaning and politically active 
Turkish migrants have defended the incorporation of 
Syrian refugees into the urban space, as valid residents; 
hence they practice inclusive urban citizenship strate-
gies. Religious groups also advocated solidarity cam-
paigns on the basis of religious justifications. Apart from 
their political orientation and religious identities, shared 
or common experiences in relation to the problems of 
local or national policies and the neo-liberal transfor-
mation of urban space, both of which were described 
as jeopardizing their incorporation into urban space as 
equal residents, are the other prominent factors driving 
their solidarity with Syrian refugees. However, unequal 
power positions still inform these urban citizenship prac-
tices and the mobilization of solidarities among Turkish 
migrants. Benefiting from their established status and 
socio-economic and political capital, they managed to 
voice their claims over who participates in the urban 
space and thereby to challenge the exclusionary dynam-
ics at a local scale. In other words, as established res-
idents, they were able to utilize both the material and 
non-material resources at their disposal in order to 
reframe the boundaries of urban citizenship. Through 
these practices of claim-making, they indeed reasserted 
their urban citizenship.
However, the same power position and the “priv-
ileged” status arising from being established residents 
combined with their experiences and sense of margin-
alization, also fueled hostility among many interviewees 
towards Syrian refugees. Seeing Syrian refugees as 
a threat to their positioning in the urban space, these 
migrants drove spaces of contestation in the neighbor-
hoods (which they often define as “theirs”). They also uti-
lized exclusionary discourses about Syrian refugees and 
reproduced the hierarchical relationship vis-à-vis them in 
socio-economic, cultural and political fields. This contes-
tation is prevalent particularly among the less educated 
interviewees working in unqualified jobs and living with 
state support and among former guest workers, even 
though some of these migrants defined themselves as 
“leftist” or adhered to cosmopolitan democratic values. 
This brings us to the framework of defensive urban cit-
izenship. As argued by Cohen (2015: 171), “rather than 
simplistic racism or ethnic domination, this type of 
conduct is better understood within the context of a reac-
tive place-based identity deployed by disenfranchised 
urban populations who – relegated to the lowest eco-
nomic and identity echelons of urban society with little 
chance of ever moving up (or out) – resort to practices of 
resistance toward ethnic ‘others’ who are perceived to be 
infringing upon their modest turf.”
Accordingly, it is the long-lasting failure of local and 
national policies which has fed the everyday discrim-
ination and marginalization of Turkish migrants, and 
the neo-liberal transformation with its repercussions for 
social benefits, employment, housing and education that 
has heightened Turkish migrants’ fears about Syrian ref-
ugees and contributed to a reactive place-based iden-
tity. On the part of Turkish migrants, competition over 
scarce resources emerged, which in turn has fed hos-
tility towards newcomers, who are regarded as “outsid-
ers” or “illegitimate recipients” of these benefits and ser-
vices. Hence, following Cohen (2015: 170), it is right to 
suggest that Turkish migrants are “‘threatened’ by both 
the neo-liberal order and the new transformation of their 
space through incoming migration.”
On the other hand, well-educated Turkish migrants 
with the necessary economic means have also resorted 
to practices of defensive urban citizenship, aiming to 
“demarcate group boundaries in the face of Syrian ref-
ugees” (Cohen 2015: 171). They have engaged in spatial 
differentiation, for example, by moving into neighbor-
hoods with better education opportunities or by refrain-
ing from encounters with Syrian refugees in other public 
spaces, such as cafes. Similarly, this unequal power 
position has manifested itself in the informal and pre-
carious employment of Syrian refugees. In this context, 
these practices shed light on the relational and hierar-
chical formation of urban citizenship by established 
groups vis-à-vis newcomers, who do not have the nec-
essary socio-economic capital to claim their rights over 
the usage of urban space. They further illustrate how 
structural forces, e.g. the (neoliberal) urban economy 
and exclusionary local/national migration policies, shape 
urban citizenship formations through creating new mar-
ginalized groups and spatial hierarchies.
Furthermore, as a crucial intervening factor, transna-
tionality should be also taken into account when unpack-
ing the process of remaking urban citizenship by Turkish 
migrants towards Syrian refugees. On the one hand, sol-
idarity efforts were limited by migrant diversity especially 
in terms of political orientation and religious and ethnic 
background; this diversity remained intact because of 
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transnationality and contributed to the polarization among 
Turkish migrants. On the other hand, long-established 
anti-Arab sentiments pertaining to the Turkish political 
and cultural landscape, which are coupled with current 
anti-Syrian sentiments, have structured the reactions 
of some of the Turkish migrants. Regardless of political 
orientation and ethnic or religious identity, these Turkish 
migrants have depicted Syrian refugees as culturally 
inferior, radical, violent and criminal. These prejudices 
have further contributed to exclusionary discourses and 
spatial differentiation, as expressed by female migrants 
who raised concerns over their physical security on the 
streets, and by others who complained about the “inva-
sion” of public spaces and thereby refrained from spatial 
encounters with the refugees.
In sum, revealing the contested nature and multi-
plicity of urban citizenships, Turkish migrants’ relational 
urban citizenship formation paved the way both for inclu-
sionary and exclusionary dynamics. This forces us to 
rethink the conceptualization of urban citizenship, which 
mostly points to “progressive acts” striving to ensure 
“more dignified urban spaces for all inhabitants” (Cohen/
Margalit 2015: 667). As the defensive urban citizenship 
framework suggests, long-established groups can reas-
sert their urban citizenship by creating new spaces of 
exclusion and spatial differentiation. Moreover, the 
research further demonstrates that while unpacking the 
formation of different urban citizenships, it is necessary 
to refrain from reductionist and simplistic categorizations 
of migrants and residents. Specific economic, social, 
political and cultural identities which lead to differential 
power positions in urban space do not by themselves 
explain the emergence of a particular urban citizenship 
(inclusive or defensive). Rather, markers of social iden-
tity, including class, religion, ethnicity and gender, have 
to be contextualized and interpreted through their inter-
action with local, national and transnational dynamics. 
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